NOTE
The Uncertain Rights of the Unknown Child: Federal
Uniformity to Social Security Survivors Benefits for the
Posthumously Conceived Child After Astrue v. Capato
I. Introduction
In today’s economy, possibly more than ever, the modern family is faced
with the worry and need for financial security. That necessity is only
intensified when a family starts to expand with the addition of children. In
2010, the United States Department of Agriculture calculated that the total
expenditures spent raising a child from birth to age seventeen was
$226,920.1 This represents a 22% increase from 1960, with children’s
health care expenses doubling as compared to other costs during the same
time period.2 Given the large costs associated with raising a child, it is
understandable that parents and potential parents look to utilize all available
means of income.
For some unfortunate families, the economic hardship of raising a child
may be exacerbated by the death of one parent. Such a situation often
leaves the surviving parent as the sole financial provider for the child. Some
surviving parents, however, may find a potential source of income from the
federal government through the Social Security Act (the Act).3 The Act
provides financial relief to qualified workers and their family members if
they meet certain requirements. While there are many benefits for which a
family member may qualify based on his or her relationship to a qualified
worker,4 this note specifically addresses the relationship status of a

1. MARK LINO, CNPP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY
FAMILIES, 2010, at 20-21 (Miscellaneous Pub. No. 1528-2010, 2011), available at http://
www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/CRC/crc2010.pdf (calculating the “total family expenses
on a child through age 17 . . . for households . . . in the middle [income group]” and
adjusting costs to 2010 dollar values).
2. Id. at 23.
3. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SURVIVORS BENEFITS 4 (SSA
Pub. No. 05-10084, 2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10084.pdf (“The loss of the
family wage earner can be devastating . . . . Social Security helps by providing income for
the families of workers who die . . . . 98 of every 100 children could get benefits if a working
parent dies. And Social Security pays more benefits to children than any other federal
program.”).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402-416 (2012).
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posthumously conceived child to a predeceased worker-parent and the right
of such a child to claim social security child’s insurance benefits.5
The posthumously conceived child’s right to child’s insurance under the
Act has been a contentious issue in recent years. As a result, the circuit
courts were continually called upon to answer the question of insurance
availability.6 The answers, however, failed to be consistent. More
specifically, the circuit courts split on the child status question, reaching
opposite conclusions on who qualified as a “child” under the provisions of
the Act.7
As a result of the circuit courts’ failure to reach consensus, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. to resolve the
issue.8 The Court, based on the language of the Act and the proper standard
of review, correctly held that a posthumously conceived child does not
automatically qualify for child’s insurance benefits.9 Instead, his or her
“child” status must be determined based on applicable state intestacy
statutes.10 To hold otherwise would have contradicted the purpose and plain
reading of the Act. As a result, the posthumously conceived child’s right to
claim child’s insurance benefits under the Act rests solely on that child’s
ability to claim from his or her predeceased parent’s estate through state
intestacy law.11
Understanding this position to be correct requires knowledge of the
history of the issue, which will permit fuller comparison and a more
thorough analysis of the ultimate “child” status question. Part II of this note
provides that history, discussing the standard used by courts to evaluate an
agency’s interpretation of a federal statute. The section also reveals the
competing views that different jurisdictions took prior to Capato when
considering the question of status for posthumously conceived and born
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).
6. See, e.g., Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2689 (2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680
(2012); Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d
sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021.
7. Compare Beeler, 651 F.3d at 964-66 (holding that a posthumously conceived child
is not a qualified child under the Act), and Schafer, 641 F.3d at 60-61 (same), with Capato,
631 F.3d at 632 (holding that a posthumously conceived child is a qualified child under the
Act), and Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596-97 (same).
8. 132 S. Ct. 576 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
9. Capato, 132 S. Ct at 2033-34.
10. Id. at 2034.
11. Id. at 2032-34.
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children. This framework sheds light on Part III’s analysis of the Capato
decision itself. Part IV assesses the present state of the law and considers
how states like Oklahoma, a state with unclear intestacy laws regarding
posthumously conceived children, may fit within the Capato paradigm.
Given precedent from other jurisdictions, rights of the posthumously
conceived child may or may not be protected under extant Oklahoma
legislation and case law.
II. The Law Before Capato
A. The Social Security Act
The Act is “[t]he principal law governing the awarding of social security
benefits.”12 It provides individuals with financial support at a time when it
is needed most. The Act is more than a welfare program. Rather, “the
general purpose . . . of the [applicable] provisions of the statute is to protect
workers and their dependents from the risk of loss of income due to the
insured’s old age, death, or disability.”13 The creators of the Act understood
that “[a]ll peoples throughout . . . history have faced the uncertainties
brought on by unemployment, illness, disability, death and old age.”14 In an
attempt to mitigate the harm such events cause, the Act was signed into law
in 1935.15 Upon signing the Act, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:
We can never insure one hundred percent of the population
against one hundred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of
life, but we have tried to frame a law which will give some
measure of protection to the average citizen and to his family
against the loss of a job and against poverty-ridden old age.16
The Act is designed to provide workers with future retirement benefits
drawn from a joint fund that workers contribute to over the course of their
careers.17 As payback for their work-life contributions, workers and their
families are later entitled to the benefits created by the Act.18 In other
words:
12. 1 SOCIAL SECURITY LAW & PRACTICE § 1:1 (2013).
13. Id.
14. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last modified Jan. 10, 2013).
15. Id.
16. Presidential Statement upon Signing the Social Security Act, 4 PUB. PAPERS 324
(Aug. 14, 1935).
17. See SOCIAL SECURITY LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 1:1.
18. See id.
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The “right” to social security benefits [by a worker or family
member] is in a sense “earned,” for the entire scheme rests on
the legislative judgment that those who in their productive years
were functioning members of the economy may justly call upon
that economy, in their later years, for protection from the rigors
of poverty.19
The right to benefits is solely statutory.20 Thus, “the law governing
eligibility . . . is found exclusively in: (1) the Act; (2) the regulations
promulgated by the SSA [Social Security Administration]; and (3)
interpretations of the statute and regulations made by the SSA and federal
and state courts.”21
Because the Act provides benefits to a worker’s family members, an
initial, but not always simple, question must first be answered. Who is
considered a family member? In the context of survivors child’s insurance
there are primarily three sections that interplay to determine who can
qualify for survivors child’s insurance: §§ 402(d), 416(e), and 416(h).
Section 402(d) is the guiding regulation on awarding child’s insurance
benefits.22 It provides that “[e]very child (as defined in section 416(e) of
[title 42]) . . . of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured
individual” is entitled to insurance benefits if that child meets all of the
listed requirements.23 Section 402(d) specifically cross-references § 416(e)
as providing the definition of “child.”24 Consequently, in order to obtain
“child” status, the child must meet the definition provided in § 416(e).
Section 416 provides for additional definitions that apply to insurance
programs.25 As such, § 416(e) provides the definition of a “child,” and in
doing so lists a number of qualifying means:
The term “child” means (1) the child or legally adopted child of
an individual, (2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for not
less than one year immediately preceding the day on which
19. Id.
20. Id. § 1:3.
21. Id. (footnotes omitted).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2012).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (emphasis added) (specifying that requirements include that
the “child (A) has filed application for child’s insurance benefits, (B) at the time such
application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a
full-time elementary or secondary school student and had not attained the age of 19 . . . , and
(C) was dependent upon such individual,” among other requirements).
24. Id.
25. See id. § 416.
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application for child’s insurance benefits is filed or (if the
insured individual is deceased) not less than nine months
immediately preceding the day on which such individual died,
and (3) a person who is the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an
individual or his spouse . . . .26
The agency’s general regulation regarding criteria to qualify as a “child”
under § 416(e) is 20 C.F.R. § 404.354.27 This section provides that an
applicant “may be related to the insured person in one of several ways and
be entitled to benefits as his or her child, i.e., as a natural child, legally
adopted child, stepchild, grandchild, stepgrandchild, or equitably adopted
child.”28
Beyond the list in § 416(e) of qualifying relations, § 416(h) is an
additional definition section.29 Section 416(h) assists in determining family
status:
[T]he Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such [state]
law as would be applied in determining the devolution of
intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which
such insured individual is domiciled . . . or, if such insured
individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was
domiciled at the time of his death . . . . Applicants who according
to such law would have the same status relative to taking
intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed
such.30
In addition, § 416(h) indicates that its relevant terms apply to the entire
subchapter.31
The broad language of the Act, with various chapters, subchapters, and
sections, lends itself to several possible interpretations as to who qualifies
for “child” status. As a result, courts have been called on for guidance and
resolution. The circuits, however, failed to find consensus, primarily
reaching two different results. One result was that the Act’s language is
clear that biologically related, posthumously conceived children meet the
26. Id. § 416(e).
27. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2689
(2012).
28. 20 C.F.R. § 404.354 (2012) (further referencing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.355-.359 for
determining the relationship of an applicant to an insured person).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h).
30. Id. § 416(h)(2)(A).
31. See id.
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initial definition in § 416(e) and therefore qualify for “child” status despite
objections from the Social Security Agency.32 The other result, however,
was that the Act’s language is unclear.33 As such, the Social Security
Agency’s interpretation of the Act, which requires application of state
intestacy laws to determine “child” status, was entitled to Chevron
deference and was controlling.34
B. The Chevron Deference Standard of Review
Interpreting the Act requires courts to review an administrative agency’s
implementation of a federal statute. In Chevron, the Supreme Court
established the standard for courts to use in evaluating how an
administrative agency interprets and implements a statute for which it is
responsible.35 The Court held that when a court evaluates an agency’s
construction of a statute it must first determine if Congress has directly
addressed the issue in question.36 If so, Congress’s intent controls.37 On the
other hand, if Congress has not directly addressed the issue, the reviewing
court’s only question is whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute
“is based on a permissible construction.”38 The Court continued, stating
“that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the
principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”39 The Court
concluded:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of
the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In
such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a
32. See Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); GillettNetting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct.
2021.
33. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2689 (2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54, 63 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2680 (2012).
34. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 962; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54, 61.
35. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
36. Id. at 842.
37. Id. at 842-43.
38. Id. at 843.
39. Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
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duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of
the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches.”40
With this guidance, the courts have set out to determine who qualifies as a
“child” under the Act.
C. The Court Decisions
The unfortunate circumstances that give rise to this status question
generally follow similar fact patterns.41 A husband and wife, who plan to
start a family in the future, receive the devastating diagnosis that the
husband has cancer.42 In order to treat his condition, the husband must
undergo chemotherapy.43 After learning that chemotherapy often causes
male sterility, the husband arranges to bank his sperm for future use.44
Ultimately, the husband loses his battle with cancer.45 Following his death,
the wife uses reproductive technology and the husband’s banked sperm to
conceive a child.46 Once the child is born, the wife applies for child’s
insurance benefits on behalf of the posthumously conceived child in
relation to the predeceased father.47 The Social Security Agency, in turn,
looks to the child’s status under applicable state intestacy laws to determine

40. Id. at 866 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
41. See, e.g., Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2689 (2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680
(2012); Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d
sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021.
42. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 627;
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594.
43. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 627;
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594.
44. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 627;
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594.
45. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Capato, 631 F.3d at 627; Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d
at 594. The husband in Schafer died due to a heart attack, rather than as a direct result of
cancer. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51.
46. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 628;
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
47. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 628;
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
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status under the Act.48 Faced with similar facts and the same question, the
federal circuits’ treatment of the issue has varied.49
1. The Initial Issue of “Child” Status Brought to State Courts
As the issue of claiming benefits for a posthumously conceived child
first arose, state courts were called upon to add insight and meaning to state
intestacy laws.
a) In re Estate of Kolacy: A Posthumously Conceived Right to Inherit
Under New Jersey Law
When the action, which sought a declaratory judgment that
posthumously conceived children could inherit under state intestacy law,
was brought before the New Jersey court, there was no court case dealing
with the issue.50 The court’s analysis began with a look at basic estate law
principles.51 The court explained that “the identity of people who will take
property from a decedent has traditionally been determined as of the date of
the decedent’s death.”52 That determination, however, has been subject to
“exceptions . . . based on human experience.”53 The court recognized that
there are times when a man “cause[s] a woman to become pregnant and
then die[s] before the . . . child is born.”54 This routine human experience—
that sometimes a child is born after the death of the father—has resulted in
statutory law that “hold[s] the process of identifying takers from a
decedent’s estate open long enough” for the posthumously born child to
inherit “from and through [the] father.”55 To answer the more complicated
issue of whether a child both posthumously conceived and posthumously

48. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966 n.4; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at
628.
49. Compare Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966 (holding that “child’s insurance benefits [are
determined] by reference to state intestacy law”), and Schafer, 641 F.3d at 63 (holding that
determining child’s insurance eligibility by reference to state intestacy law was at least a
reasonable interpretation entitled to Chevron deference), with Capato, 631 F.3d at 632
(holding that an undisputed biological relationship can determine “child” status), and GillettNetting, 371 F.3d at 597 (holding that § 416(h) “do[es] not come into play for the purposes
of determining whether a claimant is the ‘child’ of a deceased wage earner unless parentage
is disputed”).
50. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
51. See id. at 1260-61.
52. Id. at 1260.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1261.
55. Id.
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born could inherit through and from a deceased father, the court was
required to look at existing state intestacy and parentage laws.56
First, the court looked at state intestacy law.57 The court stressed that the
ideal handling of this issue would take place at the legislative level.58
However, the court recognized that even without a statutory provision
directly on point, justice required the court to give present day meaning to
existing law.59 The court determined that the basic legislative intent was to
allow a posthumously conceived child to inherit, and that “intent should
prevail over a restrictive, literal reading of” the statute.60
In addition, the court considered the state’s parentage act.61 As a whole,
most of the parentage act’s provisions did not pertain to the present issue.62
The court held, however, that the sensible reading of the relevant provisions
and the basic human experience brought to light by reproductive technology
allowed for these particular children, in this case, to inherit under state
intestacy.63
56. Id. at 1261-63.
57. See id. at 1260.
58. Id. at 1261.
59. Id. at 1261-62.
60. Id. at 1262. The court recognized that “[i]t would undoubtedly be both fair and
constitutional for a Legislature” or court to put limits on the amount of time that could pass
between a father’s death and the posthumously conceived child’s birth in certain
circumstances. Id. However, it also recognized that the children’s right to inherit in this case
did not present any administrative complications for the decedent’s estate and, therefore, no
time limit was required. Id.
61. See id. at 1262-63.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1262-64. The court looked at two relevant provisions in the state’s parentage
act. See id. at 1262-63. The first provision provided that “[a] man is presumed to be the
biological father of a child if: He and the child’s biological mother are or have been married
to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage
is terminated by death, annulment or divorce.” Id. at 1262 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:1743a(1) (West 1998)). While a plain reading of this provision would suggest that a child born
more than 300 days after a man’s death would not be considered his “child,” the court
determined that to find as such would create a presumption against parentage and that “such
a . . . presumption of non-parentage would be somewhat strained because it is
counterproductive to the purposes of the act.” Id. at 1263. The second provision provided, in
part, that:
a. If under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not
her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a
child thereby conceived. The husband’s consent shall be in writing and signed
by him and his wife . . . .
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b) Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security: A Federal Court
Requests a “First Impression” Answer from a State Court
The first time a federal court was called upon to answer the question of a
posthumously conceived child’s inheritance rights with respect to the Act
was in Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security.64 To resolve the
issue, the District of Massachusetts sent a certified question to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, asking whether children
posthumously conceived using medical technology “enjoy[ed] the [same]
inheritance rights of natural children under Massachusetts’ law of intestate
succession.”65
The state court began its analysis by turning to the state’s intestacy
laws.66 The statute regarding posthumous children provided that they
“‘shall be considered as living at the death of their parent.’”67 The court
noted, however, that the legislature had left both the modifier “posthumous”
undefined and the provision unchanged for 165 years.68 The court
recognized that assisted reproductive technology, which made posthumous
conception possible, had been available and widely known for decades,
during which time the legislature failed to take any steps to narrow the
scope of the state intestacy laws.69 The court determined that “the
Legislature’s overriding purpose [was] to promote the welfare of all
children,” and that while “[p]osthumously conceived children may not
come into the world the way the majority of children do[] . . . they are
children nonetheless.”70 The court then sought to balance the interests of
posthumously conceived children with three important state interests: (1)
b. Unless the donor of semen and the woman have entered into a written
contract to the contrary, the donor of semen provided to a licensed physician
for use in the artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is
treated in law as if he were not the father of a child thereby conceived and shall
have no rights or duties stemming from the conception of a child.
Id. at 1263 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:17-44). The court accepted the
mother’s statement that the decedent-father expressly authorized the use of his sperm for
conception after his death. Id. Based on these considerations, the court found that a
posthumously conceived child could inherit from the predeceased father under state
intestacy law. Id. at 1263-64.
64. See 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
65. Id. at 259.
66. See id. at 262-70.
67. Id. at 264 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 8 (repealed 2008)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 265.
70. Id. at 266.
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protecting the rights “of children who are alive or conceived before the
intestate parent’s death,” (2) “provid[ing] certainty to heirs and creditors,”
and (3) “honor[ing] the reproductive choices of individuals.”71 Ultimately,
the court decided that a posthumously conceived child could inherit through
intestate succession if there was a biological connection between the child
and the deceased parent, and the deceased parent “affirmatively consented
to posthumous conception and to the support of any resulting child.”72
However, time restrictions could ultimately preclude inheritance.73
By recognizing the potential right of a posthumously conceived child to
inherit through intestate succession, the court laid the foundation for such
children to claim benefits under the Act. The actual receipt of benefits,
however, has failed to be automatic or uniform.
2. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart: A Genetically Related Child Automatically
Qualifies for Benefits
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal
appeals court to address the status of posthumously conceived children
under the Act.74 The court first looked at the language of the Act and found
that it “define[d] ‘child’ broadly to include any ‘child or legally adopted
child of an individual.’”75 The court recognized that § 416(h) provided the
means for qualifying as a “child” under the Act by determining if that child
would inherit from the parent through state intestacy.76 The court, however,
found that § 416(h) only came into play when parentage was in dispute, and
that “nothing in the statute suggests that a child must prove parentage under
§ 416(h) if it is not disputed.”77 Therefore, the court determined that
because biological parentage was not disputed, § 416(h) of the Act was
inapplicable, and the posthumously conceived child qualified as a “child”
of the father for purposes of the Act.78 Therefore, the child was entitled to
survivors benefits.79 Because the court found the Act’s language clearly
provided for biologically related children to claim benefits, it did not
address the issue of applying Chevron deference to the SSA’s
71. Id. at 266, 268.
72. Id. at 272.
73. Id.
74. See 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132
S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
75. Id. at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2000)).
76. Id. at 597.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 599.
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interpretation. The court’s analysis provided the federal circuits with an
initial framework for future cases. Seven years later, the issue was again
raised in federal court with three cases in three different circuits—the Third,
Fourth, and Eighth.80
3. The Third Circuit’s Treatment of Capato: Agreement That Biological
Parentage Qualifies a Child for Benefits
In Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Third
Circuit followed an analytical mode similar to that used by the Ninth
Circuit in Gillett-Netting.81 The court determined that “[t]he plain language
of §§ 402(d) and 416(e) provides a threshold basis for defining benefit
eligibility.”82 Section 416(h) was to be used to determine eligibility only
where an applicant’s relation to a deceased wage earner was in doubt:
“Were it the case that such status had to be determined here, we would turn
to the relevant provisions of § 416(h).”83 The court held that because the
children in this case were the undisputed biological children of the husband,
they automatically qualified as “children” within the meaning of the Act.84
The Third Circuit’s agreement with the Ninth Circuit appeared to solidify
the Act’s status issue regarding posthumously conceived children.
However, other circuits disagreed.
4. Schafer v. Astrue: Where the Split Began
The Ninth and Third Circuits found the plain language of the Act to be
clear, which required no evaluation of the SSA’s interpretation.85 As the
status issue continued to make its way to the federal circuit level, however,
other circuits did not find the meaning so clear. As a result, circuits began
to apply the Chevron deference standard of review.86 Once the SSA’s
interpretation of the Act was given deference, the only way to qualify for
“child” status was through state intestacy laws as required by § 416(h).87
80. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2689
(2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012);
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom.
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
81. Compare Capato, 631 F.3d at 628-32, with Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595-99.
82. Capato, 631 F.3d at 631.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 632.
85. See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 55.
86. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 959-62 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2689 (2012); Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54-62.
87. See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 62-63.
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In Shafer v. Astrue, the Fourth Circuit took up the question previously
considered by the Ninth and Third Circuits.88 Like the previous circuit
decisions, this court centered its focus on whether the posthumously
conceived child met the statutory requirements of the Act by looking at the
language of the Act itself.89 The court noted, however, that under the
principles established by the Supreme Court in Chevron,90 an agency’s
interpretation may not be overruled unless it is “‘arbitrary or capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”91 The court determined
that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act, which requires a “child” to be
eligible to inherit through state intestacy, pursuant to § 416(h), was
reasonable and entitled to deference.92 As a result, the court affirmed the
district court’s denial of benefits.93
5. Beeler v. Astrue: Agreeing to Apply Chevron Deference to the Act’s
Interpretation
Shortly after Schafer, the Eighth Circuit faced the same question.94 The
court maintained that the SSA’s denial of benefits to a posthumously
conceived child, who could not inherit under applicable state intestacy,
“was supported by reasonable construction of the governing statutes and
regulations.”95 Thus, the court reversed the decision of the lower court and
remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the SSA.96
The court followed the Fourth Circuit’s line of reasoning, focusing first
on the interplay of the appropriate provisions of the Act, namely the
similarities, references, and differences between §§ 402(d), 416(e), and
416(h).97 The Eighth Circuit ultimately concluded, however, that this was
“a question of statutory interpretation” left to the SSA.98 The court
recognized that “[w]hen Congress has delegated authority to an
administrative agency to interpret and implement a federal statute, we give
88. See 641 F.3d 49.
89. See id. at 51-52.
90. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
91. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 61 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011)).
92. Id. at 62-63.
93. Id. at 63.
94. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2689 (2012).
95. Id. at 966.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 957-59.
98. Id. at 959.
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the agency’s interpretation deference pursuant to Chevron.”99 Indeed, “the
agency’s ‘view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation,’” regardless of
whether there are other possible interpretations and even if it is not the most
reasonable.100 The court determined that the agency’s interpretation of the
Act represented authoritative construction and was entitled to Chevron
deference.101 Thus, in the Eighth Circuit, the agency’s interpretation
governed.102
III. The Supreme Court Brings Federal Consistency to the Issue in Astrue v.
Capato ex rel. B.N.C.
A. Facts of the Case
In May 1999, the Capatos—Robert and Karen—were married.103 Soon
after their wedding, Mr. Capato was diagnosed with esophageal cancer.104
He was told that the chemotherapy required to treat his cancer might leave
him sterile.105 Because the couple wanted to have children, Mr. Capato
placed his semen in a sperm bank for storage prior to beginning his
chemotherapy.106 Despite the fact that Mr. Capato was undergoing intense
treatment, Mrs. Capato conceived naturally, giving birth to their son.107 But
the couple still wanted another child.108
Unfortunately, Mr. Capato’s health continued to deteriorate, and he died
in March 2002 in Florida, where he resided with Mrs. Capato.109 Mr.
Capato’s will, which was executed in Florida, named his three children as
beneficiaries.110 There were no provisions in the will that provided for any
future children; however, the Capatos had previously indicated to their
lawyer that they wanted all future children to receive the same benefits as
Mr. Capato’s then-existing children.111 After Mr. Capato’s death, Mrs.
99. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
100. Id. (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009)).
101. Id. at 962.
102. See id. at 961-62.
103. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Capato underwent in vitro fertilization using her deceased husband’s stored
sperm.112 She conceived and ultimately gave birth to twins eighteen months
after Mr. Capato’s death.113
B. Procedural History
Following the birth of her children, Mrs. Capato filed a claim on behalf
of the children for survivor child’s insurance benefits.114 The SSA denied
her claim, contending that the twins could only qualify for benefits if they
could inherit from their deceased father under applicable state intestacy
laws.115 The SSA’s decision was affirmed by the federal district court,
which found that Mr. Capato had died while domiciled in Florida and,
under that state’s intestacy law, a posthumously born child could only
inherit if he or she was conceived prior to the decedent’s death.116
Mrs. Capato appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.117 The circuit court reversed the decision of district court and held
that, “[u]nder § 416(e), . . . ‘the undisputed biological children of a
deceased wage earner . . .’ qualify for survivors benefits without regard to
state intestacy law.”118
C. Decision of the Court
In beginning its analysis, the Court recognized that the circuit courts
were divided on the statutory interpretation issue presented by the case.119
The Court looked first at the Act itself, stating that “Congress amended the
Social Security Act in 1939 to provide a monthly benefit for designated
surviving family members of a deceased insured wage earner. ‘Child’s
insurance benefits’ are among the Act’s family-protective measures.”120
The Court then looked to the particular sections of the Act, namely §§
402(d), 416(e), and 416(h), to determine who qualifies as a “child” under
the Act, and how.121

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 2027.
118. Id. (quoting Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d
Cir. 2011)).
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2012)).
121. See id. at 2027-28.
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The Court focused first on § 402(d), which provides that a child meets
the definition of “child” if he or she is (1) unmarried, (2) “below [the
statute’s] specified age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability which began
prior to age 22”, and (3) “was dependent on the insured at the time of the
insured’s death.”122 The Court turned next to § 416(e) and pointed out that
“[t]he word ‘child’ . . . appears twice in § 416(e)’s opening sentence:
initially in the prefatory phrase . . . and, immediately thereafter, in
subsection (e)(1) (‘child or legally adopted child’).”123 The Court noted,
however, that the word “child” in § 416(e) “is a definition of scant utility
without aid from neighboring provisions.”124 Rather, the useful definition is
provided by § 416(h).125 Turning to those definitional provisions, the Court
found that “[u]nder the heading ‘Determination of family status,’ §
416(h)(2)(A) provides: ‘In determining whether an applicant is the child or
parent of [an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the
Commissioner of Social Security shall apply [the intestacy law of the
insured individual’s domiciliary State].’”126
The Court then found that the SSA had interpreted these provisions of
the Act through notice-and-comment rulemaking.127 The SSA determined:
[A]n applicant may qualify for insurance benefits as a “natural
child” by meeting any of four conditions: (1) the applicant
122. Id. at 2027 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)).
123. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)).
124. Id. at 2033.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 2028 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
416(h)(2)(A)). The Court also noted that:
An applicant for child benefits who does not meet § 416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacylaw criterion may nonetheless qualify for benefits under one of several other
criteria the Act prescribes. First, an applicant who “is a son or daughter” of an
insured individual, but is not determined to be a “child” under the intestacy-law
provision, nevertheless ranks as a “child” if the insured and the other parent
went through a marriage ceremony that would have been valid but for certain
legal impediments. § 416(h)(2)(B). Further, an applicant is deemed a “child” if,
before death, the insured acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his or
her son or daughter, or if the insured had been decreed by a court to be the
father or mother of the applicant, or had been ordered to pay child support. §
416(h)(3)(C)(i). In addition, an applicant may gain “child” status upon proof
that the insured individual was the applicant’s parent and “was living with or
contributing to the support of the applicant” when the insured individual died. §
416(h)(3)(C)(ii).
Id.
127. Id.
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“could inherit the insured’s personal property as his or her
natural child under State inheritance laws”; (2) the applicant is
“the insured’s natural child and [his or her parents] went through
a ceremony which would have resulted in a valid marriage
between them except for a legal impediment”; (3) before death,
the insured acknowledged in writing his or her parentage of the
applicant, was decreed by a court to be the applicant’s parent, or
was ordered by a court to contribute to the applicant’s support;
or (4) other evidence shows that the insured is the applicant’s
“natural father or mother” and was either living with, or
contributing to the support of, the applicant.128
As such, the SSA interpreted the Act to mean that “42 U.S.C. § 416(h)
governs the meaning of ‘child’ in § 416(e)(1). In other words, § 416(h) is a
gateway through which all applicants for insurance benefits as a ‘child’
must pass.”129 In finding such, the SSA believed § 416(h)(2)(A) to provide
the definitional cue for its application of § 416(e) by providing “in [its]
opening instruction: ‘In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of
[an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter,’ the Commissioner
shall apply state intestacy law.”130 The subchapter that § 416(h) applies “is
Subchapter II of the Act, which spans §§ 401 through 434.”131 The Court
concluded that Congress, “[h]aving explicitly complemented § 416(e) by
the definitional provisions contained in § 416(h) . . . had no need to place a
redundant cross-reference in § 416(e).”132
Following the recitation of the SSA’s interpretation of the Act, the Court
had to determine what, if any, credence it should give to the interpretation.
The Court held that “Chevron deference is appropriate ‘when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’”133 The Court determined
that “the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is set forth in [published]
regulations,”134 that the regulations are consistent with authority given to
the Commissioner by Congress, and that the “regulations are neither
128. Id. at 2028-29 (second alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)).
129. Id. at 2029.
130. Id. at 2030-31 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
416(h)(2)(A)).
131. Id. at 2031.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2033-34 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)).
134. Id. at 2034.
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‘arbitrary or capricious in substance, [n]or manifestly contrary to
statute.’”135 As a result, the Court applied Chevron deference and held that
“the law Congress enacted calls for resolution of [this case] . . . by
reference to state intestacy law.”136 The Third Circuit’s previous ruling was,
consequently, reversed.137
IV. Analysis
The Court’s decision finally brings consistency to the courts regarding
posthumously conceived children and their right to claim survivor’s
benefits under the Act.
A. The Court’s Decision
In Capato, the Court brought an end to the circuit split that had resulted
from the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ holdings. The Third and
Ninth Circuits had previously focused primarily on the biological
relationship between the predeceased father and the child.138 Those circuits
determined that when the genetic relation of the child to the deceased parent
was not disputed, the child automatically qualified as a “child” under §
416(e).139
The reasoning used by the Third and Ninth Circuits was rejected by the
Supreme Court, which followed the same method of analysis as the Fourth
and Eighth Circuits.140 The Court determined that the SSA’s interpretation
of the Act satisfied the Chevron deference standard.141 Under Chevron
deference, an administrative agency’s view regarding a statute “‘governs if
it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily the only
possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most

135. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631-32 (3d Cir.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021; Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596-98 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021.
139. See Capato, 631 F.3d at 632 (holding that biological relationship determines “child”
status); Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596 (recognizing that the courts and the SSA have
interpreted “child” to include “the natural, or biological, child of the insured”).
140. Compare Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033-34, with Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 96066 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2689 (2012), and Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49,
54-62 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012).
141. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033-34.
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reasonable.’”142 The courts determined that the SSA’s interpretation of the
Act, while not the only possible interpretation, was reasonable and entitled
to deference.143
As such, the Supreme Court properly determined that the interpretation
of the Act, and the one provided by the SSA, required application of all
sections, namely §§ 402(d), 416(e), and 416(h).144 The SSA’s interpretation
holds that the only way to qualify as a “child” is to meet the criteria
established in § 416(h).145 While § 416(e) allows for a “natural child” to
qualify for benefits, the SSA contends that the only way to qualify as a
“natural child” under § 416(e) is to meet one of the criteria set out in §
416(h) (that is, to qualify as a “natural child,” a child must be able to inherit
through state intestacy laws).146 This reasoning is based on the stated
application of § 416(h), which provides “that the Commissioner ‘shall’ use
state intestacy law in determining whether an applicant is the ‘child’ of an
insured individual ‘for purposes of this subchapter.’”147 Sections 416(e) and
416(h) are part of the same subchapter.148 Therefore, all sections of the
subchapter must meet the criteria of § 416(h), including § 416(e).
The SSA’s interpretation also correlates with the legislative history of
the Act and the evolution of applicable sections. As the Court recognized,
Congress established child’s insurance benefits under the Act in 1939.149
Under its original language, “§ 209(m)—the forerunner of the current 42
U.S.C. § 416(h)—provid[ed] that ‘[i]n determining whether an applicant is
the wife, widow, [or] child . . . the [Social Security] Board shall apply such
law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal
property.’”150 In 1965, when Congress codified the current language, “the

142. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959 (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208,
218 (2009)); see also Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033-34 (reiterating that Chevron deference is
appropriate when an administrative agency’s interpretation is neither arbitrary nor capricious
in substance).
143. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026, 2033-34; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956, 959; Schafer, 641
F.3d at 51.
144. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027-28, 2030-31.
145. See id. at 2026; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960.
146. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 962, 964.
147. Id. at 963 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006)).
148. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2031 (noting that the applicable subchapter includes 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401-34).
149. Id. at 2027.
150. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 964 (second and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Social
Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 209(m), 53 Stat. 1360, 1378 (1939) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h))).
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relevant committee report explained that . . . ‘[u]nder present law, whether
a child meets the definition of a child . . . depends on the laws applied in
determining the devolution of interstate [sic] personal property.’”151 The
committee found the existing law’s effects on illegitimate children too
harsh because most illegitimate children were unable to qualify for intestate
inheritance.152 In an effort to remedy such a result, the language now found
in § 416(h)(3) was added.153 These additional protections, however, do not
mean that “§ 416(h) applie[s] only to illegitimate children or to children
whose parentage is disputed.”154 On the contrary, “[t]he preexisting
statutory framework already established that a natural child must show an
ability to inherit under state law in order to receive . . . benefits under the
Act.”155
By giving the SSA’s interpretation Chevron deference, the Court
properly disposed of the issue. Under the Chevron deference standard, an
agency’s interpretation of a statute is controlling if it is reasonable and
neither arbitrary nor capricious to the statute.156 Therefore, the SSA’s
interpretation does not have to be the only interpretation, the most logical
interpretation, or the “best” interpretation; it only has to be a reasonable
interpretation.157
Based on the language of the Act and the legislative history, the SSA’s
interpretation is reasonable. It is reasonable to read the sections of the Act
that determine the status of a “child” as an inclusive group, rather than an
exclusive independent group. Additionally, § 416(h) explicitly states that it
relates to all parts of its subchapter.158 Sections 416(e) and 416(h) are both
parts of subchapter II.159 Therefore, it is reasonable to apply the definitions
established by § 416(h) to the “child” status created by § 416(e). The
reasonableness of the SSA’s interpretation is further supported by the
legislative history of the Act. When Congress first established child’s
insurance benefits, it determined a “natural child’s” status by looking at the
151. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 109 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1943, 1958).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012).
157. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84344 & n.11 (1984)).
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2012).
159. See id. § 416(e), (h).
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right of the child to inherit through state intestacy statutes.160 When
Congress later amended the Act, the objective was not to change how a
“natural child” was determined, but instead to provide additional ways for
“illegitimate children,” who were largely excluded from state intestacy
schemes, to gain “child” status for purposes of the Act.161
With the Court’s decision, the split that plagued the courts is settled. The
rights under the Act of the unknown, posthumously conceived child,
however, are still uncertain. The battlefield has shifted to state courts and
the interpretation of state intestacy statutes.
B. The Status of a Posthumously Conceived Child in Oklahoma
Currently, the status question of a posthumously conceived child and his
or her right to claim child’s insurance under the Act has not been raised in
Oklahoma. As such, there are two possible outcomes a court could reach if,
or more likely when, the issue reaches an Oklahoma state court. Oklahoma
courts could determine either: (1) that current state intestacy laws allow for
a posthumously conceived child to inherit from a predeceased parent, or (2)
that they do not so allow.
Oklahoma intestacy law is unclear regarding the inheritance rights of a
posthumously conceived child. The laws that govern descent and
distribution do not address the posthumously born child, let alone a child
that is posthumously conceived and then born.162 Because posthumously
conceived children are not specifically mentioned in the statute and
Oklahoma case law is silent on the issue, the Oklahoma courts could look to
see what other jurisdictions with similar statutes have done. By doing so,
the courts may find a solution in the Woodward decision.163 While
Oklahoma’s descent and distribution laws do not address a posthumously
born child, Oklahoma law regarding representation and posthumous
children states that “[p]osthumous children are considered as living at the
death of their parents.”164 This is essentially the same language included in
the Massachusetts representation statute that the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court referenced when determining that posthumously conceived

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 963-64.
See id. at 964.
See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B) (2011).
See Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
84 OKLA. STAT. § 228.
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children could have intestate inheritance rights.165 The Oklahoma statute,
however, was enacted before the current realities of reproductive
technology were known.166 As a result, the courts may look at more recent
Oklahoma legislation to determine the intent of the legislature with regard
to inheritance rights and the posthumously conceived child.
Recent Oklahoma legislation suggests that the legislature may have
intended to provide rights to posthumously conceived children. Oklahoma
recently adopted aspects of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).167 The UPA
allows for a “mother of a child and a man claiming to be the genetic father
of the child [to] sign an acknowledgement of paternity with intent to
establish the man’s paternity.”168 The father’s signed acknowledgment can
establish the paternal relationship;169 however, the unanswered question
becomes whether such a signed acknowledgment can be made
preconception and still establish paternity to a posthumously conceived
child. Regarding posthumously born children, the Oklahoma legislature
adopted the provision of the UPA that provides “[a] man is presumed to be
the father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child were married to
each other and the child is born within three hundred (300) days after the
marriage is terminated by death.”170 This provision recognizes the rights of
a child conceived and posthumously born, but does not provide guidance
regarding the posthumously conceived child.171 While it does not discuss a
posthumously conceived child, a similar provision was not found to bar
such a child’s right to intestate inheritance by a New Jersey state court.172

165. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264 (“That section provides that ‘[p]osthumous children
shall be considered as living at the death of their parent.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 8 (repealed 2008))).
166. The language of the pertinent provision—title 84, section 228 of the Oklahoma
Statutes—can be traced back to at least the 1890 laws of the Territory of Oklahoma. See 88
TERR. OKLA. STAT. § 18 (1890) (“Posthumous children are considered as living at the death
of their parents.”).
167. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-101 to -902 (2011).
168. Id. § 7700-301.
169. See id. § 7700-301 to -302, -304 to -305.
170. Id. § 7700-204(A).
171. See id.
172. See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000)
(“One provision of the Parentage Act which is facially somewhat relevant to our case is
N.J.S.A. 9:17-43a(1) which reads: ‘A man is presumed to be the biological father of a child
if: He and the child’s biological mother are or have been married to each other and the child
is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death,
annulment or divorce.’” (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a) (West 2000))).
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On the other hand, the parts of the UPA that the Oklahoma legislature
did not adopt may prove more telling to the legislature’s actual intent. The
Oklahoma legislature left out the entire article on “Child of Assisted
Reproduction.”173 Specifically, the legislature did not adopt the provision of
the act that states:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by
assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting
child unless the deceased spouse [sic] consented in a record that
if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
individual would be a parent of the child.174
Adoption of this section would have provided a clear legal avenue for
establishing posthumously conceived parentage. The failure of the
Oklahoma legislature to adopt this provision suggests that it did not intend
to give posthumously conceived children intestacy inheritance rights.
As such, if a posthumously conceived child, whose father was domiciled
in Oklahoma at his time of death, applied for survivor benefits under the
Act, the child’s ability to claim such benefits is still uncertain. The
determination would be the result of best-effort judicial interpretation of
presumed legislative intent.
V. Conclusion
The Social Security Act was adopted to provide families with some
economic protection against the hardships caused by old age,
unemployment, and death. One protection provided is insurance benefits for
survivors of deceased workers. Survivor insurance is available to the child
of a deceased worker if the child meets the requirements set out by the Act.
Sections 402(d), 416(e), and 416(h) all play a role in determining “child”
status. All of these sections interrelate by reference or cross-reference.
Therefore, it is reasonable to apply all three sections when determining if a
“child” fulfills the status requirements. As a result, the SSA’s interpretation
was reasonable, and the Supreme Court correctly applied Chevron
deference in Capato. The rights at the federal level are finally clear; the
uncertainty that still exists, however, is the posthumously conceived child’s

173. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) §§ 701-707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 354-59
(2001 & Supp. 2013).
174. Id. § 707, 9B U.L.A. at 358.

218

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:195

status under various states intestacy laws. That is an issue that each state
must determine itself.
Nathan Rick Allred

